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Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force 
Richard Rosenfeld* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The killing of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, by Darren 
Wilson, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, sparked widespread 
protests in the St. Louis area and across the nation.1  Protests and civil unrest 
resumed after a St. Louis County grand jury declined to indict the police of-
ficer.2  Protesters and commentators raised several issues related to the Fer-
guson incident and police use of deadly force.  This Article addresses four of 
those issues: (1) Why Ferguson?  (2) Did the Ferguson killing and ensuing 
civil unrest increase crime rates in St. Louis?  (3) What is known about police 
use of deadly force?  (4) What additional information is needed to understand 
and respond effectively to police use of deadly force?  These are certainly not 
the only issues provoked by the Ferguson events, but they have both research 
and policy significance, and they have also been raised in response to other 
controversial police use-of-force incidents in Cleveland, New York City, 
Baltimore, and elsewhere. 
The report by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on the Ferguson 
Police Department (“FPD”) offers several reasons why Ferguson was ripe for 
protests and civil unrest over police practices in the city’s African-American 
community, including aggressive enforcement of municipal ordinances to 
generate revenue, inadequate training and supervision related to police use of 
force, and a pattern of racial bias in policing that eroded trust in the police by 
African Americans.3  Yet, such practices are clearly not unique to this small 
suburban community,4 and the DOJ report also notes that many Ferguson 
 
* Richard Rosenfeld is the Founders Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at 
the University of Missouri–St. Louis.  He is a Fellow and former President of the 
American Society of Criminology. 
 1. See Michael Brown’s Shooting and Its Immediate Aftermath in Ferguson, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/12/us/
13police-shooting-of-black-teenager-michael-brown.html?_r=0#/#time348_10366. 
 2. Latest Updates: Protests Nationwide as More Troops Are Called to Fergu-
son, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/live-
updates-grand-jury-decision-darren-wilson-ferguson/. 
 3. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lin-
gers, NPR (Apr. 4, 2015, 4:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/
despite-laws-and-lawsuits-quota-based-policing-lingers; Jaxon Van Derbeken & Viv-
ian Ho, S.F. Police Chief: 8 Officers Deserve Firing Over Text Messages, S.F. 
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residents, both black and white, take pride in their city, particularly its racial 
diversity: “Pride in this aspect of Ferguson is well founded; Ferguson is more 
diverse than most of the United States, and than many of its surrounding cit-
ies.  It is clear that many Ferguson residents of different races genuinely em-
brace that diversity.”5 
Shortly after rioting erupted in response to Michael Brown’s killing, a 
reporter wrote: “It’s still unclear why . . . tensions boiled over.  But to many 
people, it had little to do with this town.”6  This Article documents similari-
ties and differences between Ferguson and its surrounding communities, in-
cluding the City of St. Louis, that may help to explain why a controversial 
police killing took place there. 
The second issue addressed here concerns the putative connection drawn 
by police and public officials between the police killing in Ferguson and in-
creasing crime rates in St. Louis.  Drawing on the experience of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, where crime rates rose after rioting broke out in response to a fatal po-
lice shooting in 2001, police and other public officials attributed the crime 
increase in St. Louis to a “Ferguson effect” that emboldened criminals while 
diverting police from normal patrols to address civil unrest in the city.7  This 
Article analyzes month-by-month changes in crime between 2013 and 2014 
to determine whether the Ferguson events may have spurred crime increases 
in St. Louis. 
The third issue this Article considers is the state of empirical research on 
police use of deadly force.  The research literature focuses on the social con-
ditions in states and, to a lesser degree, cities that are associated with police 
killings of citizens.8  This Article maintains that neighborhoods constitute a 
better unit of analysis in such research and reports the results of a recent 
neighborhood-level study of police use of deadly force in St. Louis.9  The 
 
CHRON. (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-chief-moves-to-
fire-7-more-officers-over-6177739.php. 
 5. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 3, at 76. 
 6. Todd C. Frankel, Why the Police-Shooting Riots in Ferguson, Mo., Had 
Little to do with Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/08/12/why-the-police-
shooting-riots-in-ferguson-mo-had-little-to-do-with-ferguson/. 
 7. Joel Currier & Christine Byers, St. Louis Homicides up More than 30 Per-
cent in 2014 to Highest Total Since 2008, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 31, 2014 
9:45 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-homicides-
up-more-than-percent-in-to-highest/article_1fedee5e-71df-5b12-8f1b-
69ab62aab352.html; Amy L. Stutzenberger, Street Crime in Cities: Cincinnati, Ohio, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STREET CRIME IN AMERICA 74, 74–76 (J.I. Ross ed., 2013). 
 8. As used in this Article, the term “citizen” refers to persons against whom the 
police use force and is not meant to describe the legal or citizenship status of such 
persons.  On occasion, the term “suspect” is used interchangeably with “citizen.” 
 9. See David Klinger, Richard Rosenfeld, Daniel Isom & Michael Deckard, 
Race, Crime, and the Micro-Ecology of Deadly Force, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming Feb. 2016). 
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study recommends major improvements in the information systems used to 
monitor and explain police use of force in the United States. 
That is the fourth issue taken up in this Article: the woefully inadequate 
state of the evidence on police use of force in the United States.  Public and 
scholarly debate regarding the use of force by the police is not limited to the 
recent incident in Ferguson.  It has emerged periodically over the past several 
decades, typically after highly publicized incidents in which the police injure 
or kill an unarmed suspect.  The debates surrounding these incidents have 
produced calls to reform police practices.  But both the debates and recom-
mendations lack a strong research foundation.  From a scientific standpoint, it 
is not an overstatement to concede that very little is known about the condi-
tions under which the police decide to use force and the consequences of 
these decisions for specific incidents and for the communities in which police 
use of force occurs with some frequency.10  This Article concludes with sev-
eral recommendations for improving the evidence base regarding the police 
use of force in ways that can enhance scientific inquiry, inform public debate, 
and promote more effective policy responses. 
II.  WHY FERGUSON? 
Ferguson, Missouri, is a St. Louis suburb with a current population of 
just over 21,000 residents.11  It is located in the northern part of St. Louis 
County, a few miles from the St. Louis City border, as shown in Figure 1.12  
Like most other American cities, St. Louis has a long history of residential 
racial segregation that has persisted to the present.13  Figure 1 shades census 
tracts in the city and county by racial composition: the darker the shading, the 
higher the proportion of African Americans in the census tract.  The figure 
reveals that African-American residents are concentrated in the northern sec-
tions of the city and county.  The southern areas are largely white.  Ferguson 
is something of an outlier in this respect, with census tracts that are largely 
white, largely black, and mixed-race.  Michael Brown lived and was killed in 
a predominantly black neighborhood in the southeast section of Ferguson.14 
 
 10. See David Klinger, Police Violence Against Youth in Community Context 
20–21 (Apr. 9, 2015) (presentation at 14th Annual Youth Violence Prevention Con-
ference), 
http://www.umsl.edu/ccj/Youth%20Violence%20Prevention/2015/2015Klinger.pdf. 
 11. Ferguson (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2923986.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 12. See infra Figure 1. 
 13. COLIN E. GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY 299 (Glenda Gilmore, Michael Kazin & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 
2008). 
 14. Narry Enten, Michael Brown’s Neighborhood In Ferguson Still Lags In Vot-
er Turnout, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 8, 2015, 4:57 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
datalab/michael-browns-neighborhood-in-ferguson-still-lags-in-voter-turnout/. 
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FIGURE 1:  




The racial composition of Ferguson has undergone a reversal in just the 
past two decades.  In 1990, the city’s population was 74% white and 25% 
black; by 2010, the black population had risen to 67% and the white popula-
tion had fallen to 29%.16  The growth of the black population has been ac-
companied by rising rates of poverty and unemployment.  Table 1 compares 
Ferguson’s current poverty rate and unemployment rate with those of St. 
Louis County and St. Louis City.17  On both indicators, Ferguson is more 
similar to the city than the county, with high rates of poverty and unemploy-
ment that far exceed those in St. Louis County as a whole. 
   
 
 15. Peter Coy, The County Map that Explains Ferguson’s Tragic Discord, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-
15/how-st-dot-louis-countys-map-explains-fergusons-racial-discord. 
 16. Niall McCarthy, Chart Inside Ferguson’s Changing Demographics, FORBES 
(Aug. 19, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/
2014/08/19/chart-ferguson-white-flight. 
 17. See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: 
Racial Composition, Unemployment Rate, Poverty Rate, and Crime Rates in 
Ferguson, St. Louis County, and St. Louis City18 
 
 Ferguson St. Louis Co. St. Louis City 
Population 21,203 998,954 319,356 
% Black 67.4 23.7 49.2 
% Unemployed 12.2 8.6 14.3 
% Poor 24.9 10.9 27.4 
Homicide Ratea .094 .037 .376 
Violent Crime Ratea 4.76 2.82 15.9 
Property Crime Ratea 53.1 24.8 66.8 
a Per 1000 population in 2013. 
 
High levels of economic disadvantage are generally accompanied by 
correspondingly high rates of crime.19  That is not the case in Ferguson, at 
least with respect to violent crimes.  As shown in Table 1, homicide and total 
violent crime20 rates in Ferguson in 2013, the year before Michael Brown was 
killed, were much closer to those in the remainder of St. Louis County than to 
those in St. Louis City.  Ferguson’s property crime21 rates were somewhat 
closer to those in the city.  To be clear, Ferguson is hardly free of criminal 
violence; its homicide rate in 2013 was just over twice the national rate of 4.5 
per 100,000 inhabitants.22  But Ferguson residents are 75% less likely to be-
come the victim of a homicide than their St. Louis counterparts with whom 
 
 18. Ferguson (city), Missouri, supra note 11; Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
Statistical Query, MO. ST. HIGHWAY PATROL STAT. CTR. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/data_and_statistics_ucr_query_b
ackup.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Uniform Crime Reports]. 
 19. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Divergent Social Worlds, in AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION’S ROSE SERIES IN SOCIOLOGY 33 (Diane Barthel-
Bouchier et al. eds., 2012); ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO 
AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 34 (2012). 
 20. Violent crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  
Violent Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/violent-crime-topic-
page/violentcrimemain_final (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). 
 21. Property crimes include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  Property 
Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2013/property-crime/property-crime-topic-page/propertycrimemain_final 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2016).   
 22. See Crime Rate in Ferguson, Missouri (MO), CITY-DATA, http://www.city-
data.com/crime/crime-Ferguson-Missouri.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
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they share demographic risk factors.23  That is one reason why people, includ-
ing those of modest means, left the city for the safer confines of suburban 
communities like Ferguson.24 
Ferguson’s violent crime rate is not only well below that in St. Louis, it 
is also lower than those of several of its suburban neighbors.  For example, 
the City of Jennings (population 14,752), located to the southeast of Fergu-
son, had a violent crime rate of 10.8 per 1000 residents in 2013, over twice 
the Ferguson rate of 4.8 per 1000 residents.25  The City of Berkeley (popula-
tion 9099), to the west, had a violent crime rate of 6.4 per 1000.26  The rate in 
Dellwood (population 5004), to the east, was 6.8 per 1000, and the rate in 
Normandy (population 4987), to the south, was equal to Ferguson’s at 4.8 per 
1000.27  Among Ferguson’s nearest neighbors, only Florissant (population 
52,363), to the north, had a lower violent crime rate than Ferguson’s in 
2013.28  At 1.6 violent crimes per 1000 residents, Florissant’s rate was also 
lower than that of St. Louis County as a whole.29 
What light might these comparisons shed on why Ferguson experienced 
a controversial police shooting?  Of course, explaining a single occurrence of 
a rare event is inherently difficult.  Other things equal, however, we might 
have expected that such an incident would have been more likely to occur in 
one of Ferguson’s neighbors with a higher rate of violent crime.  Yet, as ex-
plained below, some evidence suggests that police shootings may be less 
frequent in the most violent communities than in those with mid-levels of 
violent crime – places like Ferguson.  Before reviewing research on police 
shootings, the claim that the events in Ferguson spurred a crime rise in St. 
Louis is evaluated. 
   
 
 23. See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18. 
 24. See GORDON, supra note 13, at 25. 
 25. See Jennings (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2937178.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); 
Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18. 
 26. See Berkeley (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2904906.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); 
Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18. 
 27. See Dellwood (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2919018.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); 
Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18. 
 28. See Florissant (city), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2924778.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); 
Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18. 
 29. Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 18; see supra Table 1. 
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III.  WAS THERE A “FERGUSON EFFECT” ON CRIME IN ST. LOUIS? 
Does widespread and heavily publicized protest activity directed at al-
leged police misconduct result in higher crime rates?  At first glance, that 
appeared to be true in St. Louis after Michael Brown was killed.  After de-
clining or holding steady for several years, the number of violent crimes in St. 
Louis rose by 5.3% in 2014 over the previous year.30  The increase in homi-
cide was especially pronounced.  In 2014, the police department recorded 159 
homicides, a 32.5% increase over the 2013 total of 120.31  As noted above, 
some public officials have attributed the crime increase in St. Louis to the 
police shooting in Ferguson that led to protest demonstrations in St. Louis, as 
well as Ferguson.  The protests were also in response to two fatal police 
shootings that occurred in St. Louis after the Ferguson incident.32 
To determine with certainty whether the Ferguson events caused crime 
increases in St. Louis, we would have to know the crime rates in St. Louis 
absent the Ferguson events.  Proving the counterfactual – whether y would 
not have occurred had x not occurred – is challenging.  In this case, however, 
we can ask whether the timing of the “Ferguson effect” hypothesis corre-
sponds with observed crime changes in St. Louis.  Obviously, the Ferguson 
events or subsequent police shootings could not have produced crime in-
creases in St. Louis if those increases took place before Michael Brown was 
killed.  If the increases occurred afterward, that would not prove they were 
caused by the controversial police shootings, but it is a necessary condition 
for drawing causal inferences. 
Figure 2 displays month-by-month homicide frequencies in St. Louis in 
2013 and 2014.33  The homicide count was higher in 2014 than in 2013 
throughout most the year, but it is not readily apparent from the figure wheth-
er the gap grew after Michael Brown was killed in early August of 2014.34  
To establish whether the police shooting in Ferguson and resulting protests 
may have triggered an increase in homicide, the month-by-month ratio of 
homicides in 2014 to homicides in 2013 is shown in Figure 3.35  Here we see 
 
 30. See ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, REPORT: CRM0013-BY, PART 
1 CRIME COMPARISON BASED ON UCR REPORTING NEIGHBORHOOD REPORT 91 (Jan. 6, 
2105), http://slmpd.org/crimestats/crm0013-by_201412.pdf. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Fred Barbash & Abby Phillip, Fatal Shooting of 18-Year-Old by Off-Duty 
Police Officer Ignites Protests in St. Louis, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/09/crowds-in-
streets-of-st-louis-after-fatal-shooting-by-off-duty-police-officer/; Joe Holleman & 
Lisa Brown, St. Louis Police Fatally Shoot Man Who Brandished Knife, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/st-louis-police-fatally-shoot-man-who-brandished-
knife/article_85d27316-a17a-5e0a-b1d6-8a6753e2fcb2.html. 
 33. See infra Figure 2. 
 34. See infra Figure 2. 
 35. See infra Figure 3. 
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that homicides were far more frequent in the early months of 2014 compared 
with the same period in 2013.  The ratio then decreased but began to rise 
again in June, two months before Michael Brown was killed, and at no time 
in the following months did it exceed the levels reached earlier in the year.  
These results do not support the belief that the St. Louis homicide increase in 
2014 was attributable to the Ferguson events. 
 
FIGURE 2:  












FIGURE 3:  
Ratio of St. Louis Homicides by Month, 2013-2014 
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The picture differs somewhat for other violent crimes.  Figure 4 displays 
the monthly ratio of violent crimes in 2014 to violent crimes in 2013.36  We 
see that the ratio grew early in the year, decreased for a month or two, and 
then increased again through the end of the year.  But that increase began in 
May, well before the police shooting in Ferguson.  The rate of increase in the 
violent crime ratio, however, does appear to have accelerated beginning in 
September.  The timing of these changes offers mixed support, at best, for the 
“Ferguson effect” hypothesis. 
 
FIGURE 4:  
Ratio of St. Louis Violent Crimes by Month, 2013-2014 
 


















Figure 5 displays the ratio of property crimes in 2014 over 2013.37  The 
monthly change in the property crime ratio offers the strongest evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that the Ferguson events led to crime increases in 
St. Louis, at least with respect to timing.  The property crime ratio was fairly 
flat until August, when it began to increase steadily through the remainder of 
the year.  Before August, St. Louis averaged about 15% fewer property 
crimes in 2014 than in 2013.  From August through the end of 2014, the city 
averaged 8% more property crimes than during the same period the year be-
fore.  By December, the number of property crimes in 2014 exceeded the 
number in 2013 by 27%.  If there was a “Ferguson effect” on crime in St. 
Louis, it was most pronounced in the growth of property crimes. 
 
 36. See infra Figure 4. 
 37. See infra Figure 5. 
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FIGURE 5:  




















Taken together, the timing of these monthly crime changes provides on-
ly partial support for the contention that the police shooting in Ferguson and 
ensuing protest activity spurred crime increases in St. Louis.  The increase in 
homicide in 2014 predated Michael Brown’s killing on August 9.38  Violent 
crimes exhibit much the same pattern, although the rate of increase in violent 
crimes over 2013 accelerated after August.39  Only the timing of the change 
in property crimes is fully consistent with a “Ferguson effect.”  But temporal 
consistency is not a sufficient condition to establish substantive proof.  Many 
factors may have contributed to a rise in property crimes, and perhaps also 
violent crimes, in St. Louis after August of 2014, and we cannot conduct an 
experiment to discover whether crime would have increased had Michael 
Brown not been killed in a controversial police shooting.  But we can con-
clude with reasonable certainty that the events in Ferguson were not respon-
sible for the steep rise in homicide in St. Louis. 
   
 
 38. See supra Figure 5. 
 39. See supra Figure 5. 
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IV.  WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE?40 
A sizable research literature exists on the social conditions that are relat-
ed to police killings of citizens.  The results of that research are decidedly 
mixed.  Most studies find higher rates of killings by police in places with high 
rates of violent crime.41  Some studies find that police killings are associated 
with the size of the minority population, while others find that police killings 
are more frequent in places with extensive poverty and unemployment.42  It is 
difficult to know what to make of these results, not simply because the results 
vary, but because the research literature is subject to several significant limi-
tations that preclude strong conclusions, regardless of the results. 
One limitation involves the unit of analysis used to study police killings 
and its covariates.  With a single exception, prior research on the social de-
terminants of police killings has been based on data for states and cities.  
Such large and heterogeneous spatial units can mask as much as they reveal 
about the conditions associated with police use of deadly force.  The excep-
tion is criminologist James Fyfe’s investigation of the link between crime 
levels and officer-involved shootings across twenty patrol zones of the New 
York City Police Department for the years 1971-1975.43  Fyfe found a posi-
tive relationship between crime levels and police shootings, but he looked 
only at the relationship between crime and shootings, ignoring the role that 
race and economic (or any other) factors may play in exerting direct effects 
on shootings or as possible confounds of the observed crime-shooting rela-
tionship.44  In addition, with an average population of about 400,000 resi-
dents, the within-city spatial aggregates Fyfe used are still quite large and 
heterogeneous; they hardly qualify as “neighborhoods,” even in New York 
City.45 
Research has clearly established that urban neighborhoods exhibit sub-
stantial variation in crime, demographic composition, and socioeconomic 
status.46  Moreover, some research suggests that police behavior may vary 
systematically with race and class across neighborhoods,47 and that the nature 
of police-citizen interactions in heavily minority communities may be mark-
 
 40. See Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom & Deckard, supra note 9. 
 41. See, e.g., id. 
 42. See generally id. 
 43. See generally James J. Fyfe, Geographic Correlates of Police Shootings, 17 
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 101 (1980). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Peterson & Krivo, supra note 19, at 71; SAMPSON, supra note 19, at 6. 
 47. See generally Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control 
Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156 (2001); Douglas 
A. Smith, The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior, 8 CRIME & JUST. 313 
(1986). 
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edly different than in other neighborhoods.48  The neighborhood is arguably a 
more appropriate unit of analysis than states or cities for studying police be-
havior, including use of force against citizens. 
A second drawback of prior research is the questionable reliability of the 
data used to measure police killings.  Most studies are based on data drawn 
from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, which FBI Director James 
Comey has characterized as “incomplete and therefore, in the aggregate, un-
reliable.”49  But even if the data were complete and accurate, the research 
would still undercount police use of deadly force.  That is because the exist-
ing data sources are limited to fatalities.50  Death at the hands of the police is 
not a sound operationalization of police use of deadly force.  Police are 
trained to fire at “center mass,” which means that all police shootings are 
potentially deadly.51  Yet, no one is killed in most of the incidents in which 
police officers discharge their firearms.52  Bullets fired by the police miss 
their mark in many shooting incidents, and the majority of people who are 
struck by police gunfire survive their wounds.53  Measures that count only 
dead bodies, therefore, understate by a large margin the extent of deadly force 
by the police because they omit non-fatal shootings. 
Criminologist David Klinger and colleagues sought to overcome these 
limitations of prior research on police use of deadly force in a study of police 
shootings in St. Louis between 2003 and 2012.54  The study is based on 230 
incidents in which sworn officers intentionally discharged their firearms at 
 
 48. See, e.g., Rod K. Brunson, Police Don’t Like Black People: African-
American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 71 (2007); Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Po-
licing in the United States, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2006). 
 49. James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks at Georgetown University: Hard 
Truths: Law Enforcement and Race (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race.  The Sup-
plementary Homicide Reports are part of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting pro-
gram.  See also DUREN BANKS ET AL., ARREST-RELATED DEATHS PROGRAM 
ASSESSMENT: TECHNICAL REPORT (Mar. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ardpatr.pdf; David Klinger, On the Problems and Promise of Re-
search on Lethal Police Violence, 16 HOMICIDE STUD. 78, 78–96 (2012); Loftin, et 
al., Underreporting of Justifiable Homicides committed by Police Officers in the 
United States, 1976–1998, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1117 (2003); Michael S. Schmidt, 
Scant Data Frustrates Efforts to Assess Number of Shootings by Police, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/us/us-has-limited-data-on-
shootings-involving-police.html?_r=0. 
 50. See generally Klinger, supra note 49. 
 51. See Ryllie Danylko, Shooting to Kill: Why Police Are Trained to Fire Fatal 
Shots, CLEVELAND (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/
2014/12/shooting_to_kill_why_police_ar.html. 
 52. See Klinger, supra note 49, at 85. 
 53. See id.; WILLIAM GELLER & MICHAEL J. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE 
KNOW 97 (1992). 
 54. See Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom & Deckard, supra note 9. 
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citizens during the ten-year period between 2003-2012.55  Each incident was 
allocated to the census block group in which it occurred.56  Block groups 
consist of clusters of contiguous census blocks and house between 600 and 
3000 residents.57  The average population of the 355 St. Louis block groups 
used in the study is 1000 inhabitants.58  Block groups are not perfect 
measures of “neighborhoods,” but their large number, relatively small size, 
and internal homogeneity – compared with states, cities, or police districts – 
make them a suitable unit of analysis for examining the social conditions 
associated with police shootings. 
Most of the shootings involved white male officers and young black 
male suspects armed with a gun and were precipitated by perceived criminal 
activity or “suspicious” behavior by suspects.59  About half of the shootings 
resulted in injury to suspects, but only about one in six involved fatal 
wounds.60  The shootings tended to occur in socioeconomically disadvan-
taged neighborhoods with relatively large black populations and elevated 
levels of firearm violence – but only to a point.61  Police shootings rarely 
occurred in the neighborhoods with the lowest levels of firearm violence, but 
they were also less frequent in the most violent neighborhoods.62  The shoot-
ings were most likely to occur in St. Louis neighborhoods with mid-levels of 
firearm violence.63 
Why are police shootings somewhat less likely to occur in neighbor-
hoods with the highest levels of criminal violence?  And why do some neigh-
borhoods with moderate levels of violence experience multiple police shoot-
ings?  One possibility, of course, is that the curvilinear pattern in the relation-
ship between police shootings and firearm violence derives from local cir-
cumstances.  St. Louis may differ from other large cities with respect to the 
relationship between police shootings and neighborhood characteristics, or in 
other ways not captured in the data used in this study.  For that reason, the 
authors call for comparable neighborhood-level research on police shootings 
in other cities. 
If their results are replicated in future research, the researchers speculate 
that fewer police shootings may occur in the most violent neighborhoods 
because the police or citizens, or both, take special care to avoid confronta-
tions that could result in the use of deadly force.64  Drawing on extensive 
research in organizational studies and public health, and interviews with po-
lice officers, they suggest that “mindful” police officers become more cau-
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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tious in areas with extremely high levels of violence and thus avoid shootings 
that would have occurred had they been less attentive to proper tactical pro-
cedure.65  The authors recommend that academy and in-service training pro-
grams should include thorough tactical instruction and emphasize that offic-
ers always exhibit sound tactical practices when in the field.66  Some of these 
practices are rather straightforward: clearly communicating with suspects, 
managing the physical space between themselves and armed citizens (and 
citizens who are believed to be armed), and making and following plans.67  
Other practices are more involved; for example, determining the circumstanc-
es that warrant “tactical retreat” by officers.68  All, however, present officers 
in the field with opportunities to stay out of the “tunnel of violence”69 which, 
once entered, can easily lead to otherwise avoidable police gunfire.  Training 
officers in, and emphasizing the importance of, mindful tactical principles 
and procedures assumes special urgency, the authors conclude, given recent 
community unrest in St. Louis and elsewhere across the nation in response to 
the use of deadly force by the police.70 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FERGUSON 
What implications might the results from the study of police shootings 
in St. Louis have for the incident in Ferguson?  To repeat, there are obvious 
hazards in attempting to explain a single event.  Nonetheless, it is worth re-
calling that the level of violent crime in Ferguson, although not trivial, is far 
lower than in St. Louis.  We might expect, then, that Ferguson police officers 
are less mindful of the circumstances that can result in potentially violent 
encounters with citizens, and less vigilant in applying departmental policies 
and procedures for de-escalating the use of force, compared with their coun-
terparts in the most violent St. Louis neighborhoods.  There is evidence to 
support this expectation.  According to the DOJ investigation of the FPD, de-
escalation policies were in place at the FPD at the time Michael Brown was 
killed.71  Even so, “Many officers are quick to escalate encounters with sub-
jects they perceive to be disobeying their orders or resisting arrest.”72  The 
DOJ investigation found that Ferguson officers did not receive adequate 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. David J. Spotts, Reviewing Police Use-of-Force Practices, 79 POLICE CHIEF 
12, 12–13 (Aug. 2012), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?
fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2723&issue_id=82012. 
 69. RANDALL COLLINS, VIOLENCE: A MICRO-SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 360–69 
(2008). 
 70. See Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom & Deckard, supra note 9. 
 71. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 3, at 31.  “The department prohibits the use of 
force unless reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would clearly be ineffec-
tive.”  Id. 
 72. Id. at 28. 
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training in use of force procedures and that supervisors routinely failed to 
enforce departmental de-escalation polices or adequately review use of force 
incidents.73  As a result, the FPD “does not give its officers the supervision 
they need to do their jobs safely, effectively, and constitutionally.”74 
Did FPD officer Darren Wilson act within the law and follow depart-
mental policies when he shot and killed Michael Brown?  In a separate inves-
tigation, the DOJ concluded that Officer Wilson’s actions were not “objec-
tively unreasonable” under applicable federal law permitting the use of dead-
ly force by a police officer when the officer reasonably believes a suspect’s 
actions “place him, or others in the immediate vicinity, in imminent danger of 
death or serious bodily injury.”75  Even if Officer Wilson failed to comply 
with FPD policies prohibiting the use of force against a suspect unless alter-
natives have been exhausted or are clearly ineffective,76 that would not neces-
sarily result in a constitutional violation.  According to the DOJ report, the 
Constitution and applicable federal statutes require only that police use of 
deadly force is objectively reasonable under the circumstances and does not 
constitute willful violation of the law.77  The courts have granted police offic-
ers wide discretion when deciding to use force against an individual, and of-
ficers are under no legal obligation to exhaust meaningful alternatives to the 
use of force or take, what others may judge by “20/20 hindsight vision,” a 
more prudent course of action.78 
There is no immediate indication that the courts or policymakers are go-
ing to substantially revise the legal standards applied to the use of deadly 
force by the police.  There is a broad public interest, however, in reducing the 
number of persons who are killed by the police.  Public pressures on police 
departments can prompt reviews of and changes in departmental policies and 
use of force training protocols, as they have in Ferguson and St. Louis.79 
A particularly salient, if controversial, method to emphasize in police 
training on avoiding the use of deadly force in encounters with citizens is 
“tactical retreat” (sometimes termed “tactical withdrawal” or “tactical re-
 
 73. See id. at 38–41. 
 74. Id. at 41. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE SHOOTING OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER 
DARREN WILSON 10 (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT], 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf. 
 76. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 3, at 31. 
 77. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 75, at 79. 
 78. Id. at 85. 
 79. Christine Byers, After Ferguson, Police Consider ‘Tactical Retreat’ Instead 
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straint”).80  The tactic calls for police officers to remove themselves from 
potentially violent encounters and call for back up under certain circumstanc-
es, such as when a suspect is unarmed.81  Some police officers have con-
demned the approach as “cowardice retreat,” but others contend that it is yet 
another device in the modern toolkit of smart policing.82  It is arguable that 
Officer Wilson could have used the tactic in his confrontation with Michael 
Brown.  As Michael Brown leaned into the patrol car during their struggle, 
instead of shooting him, Officer Wilson might have put his foot on the gas 
and driven ten yards ahead, thereby expanding the perimeter of the encounter, 
and radioed for backup.83  Michael Brown may have ended up with cuts and 
bruises from falling to the pavement, but he probably would not have died 
from his encounter with the police. 
VI.  WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT POLICE USE OF DEADLY 
FORCE? 
One reason the courts, legislative bodies, and many police departments 
may be slow in revising policies governing the use of deadly force is that so 
little is known about how often and under what circumstances the police use 
force against citizens.  As noted above, the national data systems on police 
shootings are inaccurate, incomplete, and lack sufficient detail to fashion 
effective, evidence-based policy responses.  If we are to devise more effective 
policies and tactics regarding police use of deadly force, the following infor-
mation, at a minimum, is needed: (1) the number of incidents that occur, 
based on a uniform definition of use of force; (2) the demographic character-
istics of the police and citizens involved in each incident; (3) the location of 
each incident; (4) the weapons, if any, used by police and citizens; (5) wheth-
er the incident resulted in death or injury to police or citizens; and (6) addi-
tional information, as discussed below, needed to describe the situational 
dynamics of the incident.  Most, but not all, large police departments compile 
this information for purposes of internal review.84  All departments should be 
required to collect it and report it to appropriate state and federal agencies, 
which, in turn, should be required to disseminate the data on an annual basis. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Wilson did call for backup after he had shot Michael Brown.  See DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 75, at 22. 
 84. See Use of Force, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=703#data_collections (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015). 
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A.  Counting the Incidents 
Seemingly, the most straightforward of these recommendations is to 
produce an accurate count of use of force incidents that occur across the na-
tion.  But to count the incidents, a uniform, operational definition of police 
use of force is needed.  Initially, policymakers may wish to limit the defini-
tion to instances of deadly force, such as those in which a police officer fires 
his gun at a citizen or uses other weapons or physical force that produce or 
could produce death or serious injury.  Eventually, however, all instances in 
which a police officer uses physical force against a citizen should be counted.  
Unfortunately, a universal definition of police use of force does not exist, and 
police departments vary widely in how they categorize specific actions, such 
as use of less-lethal methods, on the “use of force continuum.”85  The DOJ 
should consult with police leaders and researchers to establish a uniform def-
inition of police use of force to be included in a national statistical system. 
B.  Describing the Participants 
Initially, a national data system on police use of force should record the 
sex, age, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic, Non-Hispanic) of all officers and citi-
zens involved in each incident.  These descriptors, especially race and eth-
nicity, are needed to document group disparities in police use of force.  Even-
tually, however, additional information on the participants in use of force 
incidents should be compiled, including the rank and years in service of of-
ficers, prior use of force incidents in which the officers were involved, and 
the criminal records of the citizens.  This background information is needed 
to determine whether some officers use physical force against citizens at dis-
proportionate rates and the extent to which force is used against citizens who 
do not have extensive or serious criminal histories. 
C.  Location of the Incident 
The state, county, and municipality in which each incident took place, 
and the name and Originating Agency Identifier (“ORI”) number86 of the 
responding law enforcement agency, should be recorded in a national data 
system on police use of force.  In addition, the street address or census code 
for the street block where the incident occurred should be noted.  The latter 
information, which can be aggregated to census block groups, census tracts, 
or other spatial coverings, is essential for conducting the kind of research on 
 
 85. Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx (last updated Apr. 13, 
2015). 
 86. ORI numbers are assigned to law enforcement agencies by the FBI.  See 
Ordering Fingerprint Cards & Training Aids, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ordering-fingerprint-cards (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
17
Rosenfeld: Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1094 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
the social context of police use of force reported in Race, Crime, and the Mi-
cro-Ecology of Deadly Force.87 
D.  Weapons 
A national data system should compile detailed information on any and 
all weapons used or possessed by police officers and citizens involved in use 
of force incidents.  Weapons may include blunt objects (such as a club or 
baton), cutting instruments (such as a knife), firearms, explosives, or any 
other device that can cause injury or death to a human being.  It is particularly 
important to record the use of so-called less-lethal weapons by the police, 
including chemical agents (e.g., Mace), conducted electrical weapons (e.g., 
Tasers), and projectile weapons that fire bean bags, rubber bullets, or pep-
per.88  Such weapons have been known to cause injury or death and, as noted 
above, policies governing the circumstances in which they should be used 
differ across police departments.  Detailed information on weaponry in use of 
force incidents can assist policymakers and police departments in developing 
evidence-based policies and training programs to minimize the use of force 
necessary to achieve legitimate law enforcement objectives. 
E.  Outcomes 
A national data system on police use of force should record the outcome 
of each incident, including whether suspects were restrained, subdued, or 
escaped police custody, and all resulting injuries or fatalities.  Injuries should 
be coded as minor, requiring little or no medical attention, and serious, re-
quiring hospitalization or comparable medical treatment.  The source of non-
fatal or fatal injuries, by weapon type, should also be noted.  Finally, all 
weapon use or other physical force that did not result in injury or death 
should be recorded, so that injury and fatality rates can be computed. 
F.  Additional Information 
The recommendations discussed above should be regarded as minimum 
requirements for a national data system on police use of force.  Some, such as 
an accurate enumeration of deadly force incidents, the demographic charac-
teristics of participants, incident location, and whether the incident resulted in 
injury or death to police officers or citizens, should be implemented immedi-
ately.  Others, such as the number of incidents in which the police use even 
minor physical force against citizens and more extensive background infor-
mation on the participants, should be added when feasible, perhaps a year or 
 
 87. See Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom & Deckard, supra note 9. 
 88. See generally Amaury Murgado, Less-Lethal Weapon Options, POLICE MAG. 
(Mar. 06, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/weapons/articles/2013/03/less-
lethal-weapon-options.aspx (discussing alternatives to deadly force). 
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two after the system is established.  This information will greatly expand our 
current knowledge of how often, against whom, where, and with what conse-
quences the police use force against citizens.  But it is not sufficient to gain 
the kind of understanding we need to fully inform use of force policy and 
training.  That will require additional information on the situational dynamics 
of police use of force. 
Use of force incidents are dynamic events, even if they unfold over a 
brief span of time.  Participants assemble, move toward or retreat from one 
another, display or use weapons, and exchange verbal commands, threats, or 
warnings – all of which may or may not culminate in injury or death to citi-
zens, the police, or both.  Detailed information on these moving parts of use 
of force incidents is necessary to reduce the number of incidents that end in 
avoidable injuries or fatalities and increase the number that end peacefully.  
Some of that information is currently compiled by most police departments 
and can be transferred as discrete data elements to a national data system with 
little difficulty.89  Ultimately, however, the situational dynamics of each inci-
dent should be documented in their entirety in a comprehensive data reposito-
ry, in the form of detailed narrative descriptions and video and audio record-
ings. 
The discrete data elements that can be added to a national data system 
on police use of force without much difficulty include, but are not limited to: 
the number of police officers and citizens involved in the incident; whether or 
when the first officers on the scene called for backup; officers who dis-
charged their firearm or less-lethal weapon; officers who used other physical 
force to subdue or restrain a citizen; citizens who used a weapon (by type) or 
other physical force against officers; officers and citizens struck by bullets, 
less-lethal projectiles or substances, or subject to physical force in other 
ways; and officers and citizens injured or killed.  Another important piece of 
information, especially for training purposes, is the positioning of officers in 
relation to the citizen(s) and how the positions of the participants may have 
changed throughout the course of the incident.  That information is best con-
veyed by a map showing the distance separating all participants and relevant 
features of the physical terrain, such as motor vehicles, buildings, roadways, 
alleyways – any attribute of the immediate environment that may have af-
forded protection, entry to and exit from the scene, or may have affected 
sightlines.  Because some use of force incidents take place over multiple ter-
rains (e.g., when officers chase a fleeing suspect), several maps may be nec-
essary to provide a complete picture of the incident as it developed over time 
and space. 
Discrete data elements and maps, however, can convey only so much in-
formation about the dynamics of use of force incidents, and they may be sub-
ject to conflicting interpretations.  A narrative account of what transpired in 
 
 89. See TOM MCEWEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION ON 
POLICE USE OF FORCE 59 (Apr. 1996), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.pdf. 
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an incident, ideally written from the perspective of all officers and witnesses 
on the scene, can help to clarify ambiguous aspects of the situation.  But such 
qualitative renderings also must be interpreted and disparate accounts of what 
happened must be reconciled.90 
Current proposals to outfit police officers with body cameras seek to 
ameliorate this and other problems associated with police use of force.  The 
American Civil Liberties Union has given a qualified endorsement to the use 
of body cameras by police,91 and one randomized controlled study found that 
the use of body cameras significantly reduced the number of use of force 
incidents and citizen complaints of officer misconduct.92  As with all portray-
als of use of force incidents, however, audio and video recordings, no matter 
how unblemished or complete, will remain open to varying interpretations. 
There exists no single, unambiguous, objective perspective on the 
“facts” of a specific instance of police use of force.  Subjective judgment will 
always be required to order and illuminate a given fact pattern.  Nonetheless, 
the availability of manifold data elements, maps, narrative accounts, and re-
cordings can provide valuable guidance to policymakers, the police, research-
ers, and anyone else who makes a good faith effort to understand the situa-
tional dynamics of police use of force.  A comprehensive national data sys-
tem containing all of these components will take years to implement fully and 
will likely require Congressional action, but much can be accomplished now 
at both the local and national level. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The killing of Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, 
initiated both a local and national conversation about police use of deadly 
force against citizens.  This Article has addressed four questions emerging 
from that discussion: Why Ferguson?  Did the Ferguson events lead to crime 
increases in St. Louis?  What have we learned from research on police use of 
deadly force?  What remains to be learned?  These are not the only or even 
the most urgent issues prompted by the Ferguson incident – the controversial 
police response to the Ferguson protests warrants a separate assessment – but, 
together, they reveal important facets of police use of deadly force that can 
inform public debate and policy responses. 
The small St. Louis suburb of Ferguson was not destined to host a con-
tentious police shooting.  Many other American communities have experi-
 
 90. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 75, at 26–77. 
 91. Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a 
Win for All, ACLU 1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-
mounted_cameras.pdf. 
 92. Tony Farrer & Barak Ariel, Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially-
Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on 
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enced rapid racial turnover and are subject to problematic policing.  Fergu-
son’s comparatively low violent crime rate and plainly inadequate police 
training, however, may have ill-prepared its police officers to de-escalate 
potentially violent encounters with citizens.  The FPD is now training its of-
ficers in de-escalation procedures, including tactical retreat.93  It is at least 
arguable that Michael Brown would not have been killed had such training 
been in place and applied conscientiously before August 9, 2014. 
It can never be determined with certainty whether the Ferguson events 
led to crime increases in St. Louis.  It is reasonably clear, however, that the 
homicide spike was not the product of Ferguson, because homicides had be-
gun to increase well before Michael Brown was killed.  Other violent crimes 
did as well, although the increase in violent crime accelerated after August of 
2014.  The timing of the increase in property crime is most consistent with a 
“Ferguson effect,” but whether other factors were pushing up property crimes 
remains unknown and perhaps unknowable. 
Research on police use of deadly force has produced mixed and incon-
clusive results.  It is not an exaggeration to contend that we know little more 
now about the social conditions and immediate circumstances of police use of 
deadly force than we did nearly fifty years ago when the Kerner Commission 
issued its report on the urban disorders of the 1960s.94  This Article recom-
mends a major upgrading of the national information systems on police use of 
force.  Some progress can be made more or less immediately.  There are no 
technical reasons why, well into the twenty-first century, we cannot mount a 
data system that accurately records the number of deadly force incidents that 
occur each year, the geographic location of each incident, the demographic 
characteristics of the police officers and citizens involved, and the resulting 
injuries and deaths.  Other features of a comprehensive system, such as narra-
tive descriptions and video and audio recordings of incidents, will take more 
time, effort, and political pressure to implement.  But we should begin build-
ing the information systems now that can help us to reduce the number of 
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